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WHAT YOUR COMPLIANCE OFFICER
IS – AND IS NOT
BARRY S. HERRIN, FAHIMA, FHIMSS, FACHE, ESQ.†
In the strange way that thoughts connect and evolve, an experience I had
on October 11, 2019 as a panelist for the University of Maryland Carey Law’s
In-House Counsel Roundtable1 just came back to mind as I read an online post
from one of those accounting firms that sounds like people really wanting to be
lawyers who are trapped in the license of accountants. Everyone is giving advice
on what to do during and after our experience with COVID-19, and you have
already heard from me on this point.2 However, this particular measure of
information is meant to address a disturbing trend highlighted in both my panel
experience and in the accounting firm post, which is the misunderstanding of the
separate roles of the compliance officer and counsel, and—of more immediate
concern—the unhelpful (and in some cases dangerous) broadening of the role of
the compliance officer into an all-laws inspector general for the healthcare
enterprise.
THE MODERN ORIGIN OF THE HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE OFFICER
In guidance issued in 19983 by the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the OIG strongly
suggested that “effective internal controls that promote adherence to applicable
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1. Further details and information regarding this event can be found at: Hot Topics for In-House
Counsel at Health Care Institutions, UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. L., (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Programs-and-Impact/Health-Law/Events/AHLA/.
2. Barry Herrin, Teleworking Due to COVID-19? Protect PHI From Security Threats, Starting
with this Policy, HERRIN HEALTH L., https://herrinhealthlaw.com/teleworking-due-to-covid-19-protectphi-from-security-threats-with-this-policy/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).
3. 63 Fed. Reg. 8987 (Feb. 23, 1998), as supplemented by 70 Fed. Reg. 4858 (Jan. 31, 2005).
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federal and state law, and the program requirements of Federal, State and private
health plans” will “significantly advance the prevention of fraud, waste, and
abuse in these health care plans” and will permit the OIG to lessen any penalties
imposed on a provider either under the Medicare program or under the False
Claims Act.4 The OIG states in this guidance that compliance plans may have
collateral benefits to a hospital, but it is clear that the focus of the compliance
effort is for the hospital to “[fulfill] its legal duty to ensure that it is not submitting
false or inaccurate claims to government and private payors.”5 Indeed, the
guidance acknowledges that it “represents the OIG’s suggestions on how a
hospital can best establish internal controls and monitoring to connect and
prevent fraudulent activities.”6 This focus on fraud against the government and
private payors explains why the elements of an “effective” compliance program
are based on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.7
Thus, at the outset, hospital compliance efforts were confined to billing and
coding compliance, which necessarily involved medical record documentation
issues as well as compliance with the federal Anti-kickback8 and “Stark”9
statutes and corresponding regulations, and other Medicare programmatic issues
such as patient choice and “patient dumping” that would violate EMTALA.10
The guidance also explicitly states that “every hospital should designate a
compliance officer to serve as the focal point for compliance actions.”11 And,
mirroring the modern military model of the Inspector General, the compliance
officer when acting in that function12 has to have direct access to the hospital
CEO and governing body.13
This “strongly suggested” structure created a separate person independently
responsible for managing billing, coding, and physician relationship risk. This
person, who was not governed by the hospital’s general counsel or any other
institutional risk managers, could independently affect hospital policy without
the necessity of consulting with counsel before beginning an investigation into
alleged wrongful conduct. The responsibility for coordinating the hospital’s risk
response therefore became the sole obligation of the hospital’s CEO or governing

4. Id. at 8988.
5. Id.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (providing expanded federal felony treatment to the defrauding of private
healthcare payors under HIPAA); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A.2, cmt. n.3(k) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2021).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn; 42 C.F.R. § 411.350 (2020).
10. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
11. 63 Fed. Reg. at 8993.
12. The compliance officer can be a person with additional duties. Id.
13. Id.
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body, which had to act affirmatively to involve counsel after a report had been
made.
“SCOPE CREEP” AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE
OFFICER
To understand how the role of what started as a coding and billing
compliance job evolved into what one hospital executive referred to as an “allpowerful freelance busybody,” it might be helpful to understand how hospital
ethics started and then blended into compliance. In considering this evolution,
ethics as a discipline is distinct from compliance in one critical respect:
compliance is mandatory, whereas ethics are usually aspirational. Once an
ethical principle is made mandatory, it ceases to be ethical and becomes a matter
of compliance. A Forbes article written by Bruce Weinstein in 2019 quotes Carol
Tate, the then director of Ethics and Legal Compliance for Intel: “Ethics goes
beyond what the law requires. It involves doing the right thing and following
both the spirit and not just the letter of the law.”14
In healthcare, both the American Hospital Association and the American
College of Healthcare Executives have established codes of ethics which their
respective members are “required” to follow.15 However, as these are voluntary
membership organizations, their definitions of “right” have limited impact.
Some hospitals have bioethics committees that decide end-of-life and other
patient care matters, but those are often burdened by legal requirements that
significantly constrain the conduct supposedly within the purview of the
committee.16 Thus, the only way in which ethics create a burden on an
organization is when a system of “mandated ethics” requires compliance over
and above that compliance indicated by external laws and regulations. The old
joke that business ethics is an oxymoron or the continual misunderstanding about
why lawyers represent “guilty” criminal defendants both illustrate a practical
aspect of this compliance/ethics dichotomy: who gets to decide what’s “right”?
This system of “government by good idea” is limited only by the ability of
the organization to coerce its employees to do what the organization says is

14. Bruce Weinstein, What’s the Difference Between Compliance and Ethics, FORBES (May 9,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceweinstein/2019/05/09/whats-the-difference-betweencompliance-and-ethics/#5f3498347524.
15. See, e.g., ACHE CODE OF ETHICS (AM. COLL. OF HEALTHCARE EXECS. Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.ache.org/about-ache/our-story/our-commitments/ethics/ache-code-of-ethics; GUIDELINES
ON ETHICAL CONDUCT AND RELATIONSHIPS FOR HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS (AM. HOSP. ASS’N 1974),
http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/AHA%201974.pdf.
16. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994). An example of such a decision is the
withholding of medical care agreed to be clinically futile, but which is nevertheless required by federal
law governing emergency treatment. See id. Even if higher-minded and grounded in deep principles,
ethics always yields to compliance.
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“right.”17 The Forbes article further quotes Carol Tate: “If the company has a
poor culture, none of its controls, policies, or procedures will matter.”18 This, of
course, presumes that the company’s ethics statements are pervasive in the
company’s culture and not merely a statement in the employee handbook.
Converting a business’s beliefs about the world and its place in it to
disciplinary offenses capable of investigation and punishment could rightly be
seen as an expansion of the role of the human resources department or another
branch of administration. Why did this authority accrue to the person in charge
of billing and coding oversight? The short answer may lie in the way the
government (other than HHS) views ethics as a part of compliance and
particularly in how the government enforces the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(“FARs”).19
Although the FARs specifically do not apply to Medicare,20 the notion of
“best practices”21 and the now-vogueish practice in health care of borrowing
leadership and management insight from other industries22 may just have given
the compliance “industry” the leverage it needed to expand its mandate. The
FARs require that any contractor granted a contract subject to the FARs must
have “a written code of business ethics and conduct” in place within thirty (30)
days of the contract’s awarding and must at all times “promote an organizational
culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with
the law.”23 In this definition, ethics and compliance are clearly separate.
However, although the FARs do not require reports to the government for
violations of the code of ethics, the contractor is specifically required to
undertake “reasonable efforts not to include an individual as a principal24 whom
due diligence would have exposed as having engaged in conduct that is in
conflict with the contractor’s code of business ethics and conduct.”25

17. Weinstein, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. FAR 1.101-102 (2021).
20. 42 C.F.R. § 417.472(d) (2020).
21. See Shane Snow, Problem With Best Practices, FAST CO. (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3052222/the-problem-with-best-practices (calling out this sort of “peer
benchmarking” as “making you the average of everyone else that follows [those practices].”).
22. See, e.g., JOHN J. NANCE, WHY HOSPITALS SHOULD FLY: THE ULTIMATE FLIGHT PLAN TO
PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY CARE (2008) (comparing the healthcare industry to the airline industry);
CHARLES PROTZMAN ET AL., LEVERAGING LEAN IN HEALTHCARE: TRANSFORMING YOUR ENTERPRISE
INTO A HIGH QUALITY PATIENT CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2010) (comparing the healthcare industry to
the automobile manufacturing industry).
23. FAR 52.203-13(b) (2020).
24. See FAR 52.209-7 (2018) (defining principal as an “officer, director, owner, partner, or a
person having primary management or supervisory responsibilities.”).
25. FAR 203-13(c)(2)(ii)(B) (2020).
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So, even though the FARs do not mandate compliance with the contractor’s
code of ethics, the contractor is required to try to remove from any position of
ownership or control any person who in the past (or at any time?) has done
anything inconsistent with this once-aspirational code.26 Contrast this with the
approach taken by HHS with respect to Medicare participants, which only
excludes persons from ownership or control positions who commit certain
criminal offenses and program-related misconduct,27 and you can see what an
incredible broadening of the role and authority of the compliance officer
occurred, going from simply billing and coding auditing to controlling the
oversight of corporate governance and organizational mission, vision, and values
— areas that in the main do not involve satisfying any legal requirements. As if
by magic, culture is thus linked with the eligibility to receive government
contracts, and the compliance officer can now enforce and punish lapses in what
most businesses formerly thought were only goals and ideals.
THE USE OF LAW SCHOOL GRADUATES AS COMPLIANCE OFFICERS
With the growth of the oversight mandate of healthcare compliance officers
came the need for broader training of and experience for these individuals. Into
the void began stepping a variety of “credentialing” organizations, which
collectively created an alphabet of new acronyms meant to “demonstrate”
competence and expertise in this new hospital compliance “industry,” and each
of which charge dues, exam fees, continuing education fees, etc. For example,
there is the Certified Professional Compliance Officer, created by the American
Association of Professional Coders; the Certificate In Healthcare Compliance,
created by the Health Care Compliance Association; the Certified Compliance
and Ethics Professional, created by the Society of Corporate Compliance and
Ethics (which until recently was controlled by the same people that ran the Health
Care Compliance Association); the Advanced Practitioner in Ethics and
Compliance, created by the Ethics and Compliance Officer Association; the
Certified Compliance Technician, created by the American Association of
Healthcare Administrative Management; and surely others that escaped a tenminute Internet search.
Make no mistake about it: I have plenty of initials after my name, and I
personally think those have value. However, passing a test on certain discrete
topics and sitting in unevaluated continuing education classes are no substitute
for the academic rigor of the Socratic dialogue and the change in the way one
thinks critically about issues and problem-solving conveyed in the formal
professional education of – oh, I don’t know – lawyers. So, rather than shrink

26. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(a)-7(a), 7(c).
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the clearly overbroad scope of the ethics and compliance officer to one
manageable by a person without a post-graduate legal education, the healthcare
industry has doubled-down on the job description as expanded and now hires
people with academic training in law to act — not as counsel — but as
compliance officers.
Such a strategy might place highly trained critical thinkers in a position
requiring that skill set, but it also unhelpfully blurs the line between counsel and
compliance officer, especially when the compliance officer holds an active
license as an attorney in the state where the enterprise operates. This is because
lawyers have their own ethical and professional responsibilities that come with
their license to practice law. The most important of these responsibilities is the
maintenance of the attorney-client privilege when an attorney is consulted in his
capacity as an attorney.28 Unlike the armed services, civilian businesses do not
enjoy the convenience of knowing which people in an executive meeting are
functioning as lawyers simply by looking at their clothing.29 The burden
therefore falls on the licensed attorney to ensure that a client (who consults the
attorney in his capacity as an attorney) gets the benefit of the privilege with an
attorney when a businessperson (who consults a compliance officer in his
capacity as something other than an attorney) does not.
Simply stated, the attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence that is
owned by the client and protects an attorney’s communications with the client
from disclosure in legal and other proceedings.30 It can only be waived by the
client.31 It follows, therefore,32 that the role of the attorney as an attorney is
critical to determining whether the attorney-client privilege actually is available.
For example, there are judicial decisions making communications from a
corporate employee or official with a duty to investigate incidents discoverable
28. Jackie Unger, Maintaining the Privilege: A Refresher on Important Aspect of the AttorneyClient Privilege, A.B.A. (Oct. 31, 2013),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2013/10/01_unger/#:~:text=The%20
attorneyclient%20privilege%20is%20the%20backbone%20of%20the,the%20attorney%20to%20provide%20the
%20best%20legal%20advice.
29. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Sec’y of the Air Force to Members of the Air Force on Air
Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 26-2903 Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel
(Feb. 15, 2020), https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a1/publication/afi36-2903/afi362903.pdf (limiting the wear of the judge advocate insignia to those individuals appointed as and serving
as military lawyers, the distinction being an “occupation badge” and not a “qualification badge”).
30. FED. R. EVID. 502.
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003) (“A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted
by paragraph (b).”).
32. “As clear as is the summer’s sun,” said the Archbishop of Canterbury in recounting a tedious
description of French heraldic descent. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Henry V act I, sc. 2 l. 88.
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and not subject to any confidentiality restrictions.33 One such decision is Long
v. Anderson University, in which a federal court in Indiana compelled the
production of internal investigative materials because the investigation was
conducted in accordance with the university’s harassment policy, and not
specifically at the direction of counsel in anticipation of litigation.34 In addition,
another federal court in Minnesota explained, the delegation of “ordinary
business obligations” to a licensed attorney does not result in the application of
the attorney-client privilege.35 And, as if these rulings are not sufficiently
damaging, other federal courts have held that the privilege would not apply to
“any communication that would have been made because of a business purpose
even if there had been no perceived additional interest in securing legal advice.”36
A broad mandate for a compliance officer to investigate breaches of policy and
internal guidance would certainly fall into these categories, and it would not
appear to make any difference to the courts that the compliance officer was a
licensed attorney: everything the compliance officer did would be discoverable
by the government, by the plaintiff’s bar, or (if the hospital is a public entity) by
its competitors in an open records request.
THE GENERAL COUNSEL AS COMPLIANCE OFFICER
As if the growth in the portfolio of the healthcare compliance officer is not
bad enough for organizations and their management (or mismanagement) of the
attorney-client privilege, many have decided to get more “bang for the buck” and
have lawyers functioning in the dual role of compliance officer and general
counsel.
For the attorney-client privilege to attach, the communication (a) must
relate to a fact communicated for the purpose of receiving legal advice and (b)
must be communicated to the attorney in his capacity as an attorney and not in
some other capacity.37 Courts around the country are singularly unforgiving of
this line-blurring duality. Thus, in In Re Grand Jury Proceedings of Browning
Arms Co., the Eighth Circuit held that the privilege was inapplicable to
communications between the corporation and an attorney serving on its board of
directors because the relationship was not explicitly that of attorney and client.38
33. Long v. Anderson University, 204 F.R.D. 129 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
34. Id.
35. See Lumber v. PPG Indus., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 641, 646 (D. Minn. 1996) (Memorandum Order,
Aug. 16, 1996) (“[The] mere involvement of an attorney, in the ordinary business activities of a party,
cannot legitimately shield those activities from discovery [and would] create a blanket obstruction to
discovery of its claims investigation.”).
36. McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 238 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1975)).
37. FED. R. EVID. 502.
38. 528 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1976).
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Courts have also held communications with an attorney who is functioning as an
attorney, for the purpose of obtaining political rather than legal advice, are also
not subject to the privilege.39 Additionally, communications about legal
procedures and case status, when legal advice is not being sought, also are not
protected.40 Furthermore, if the attorney is consulted about business advice
rather than legal advice, the privilege does not apply.41 And, just to make sure
there are no misunderstandings, courts have also held merely having an attorney
in the room does not convert everything said in the room to a privileged
communication.42
And it’s not just the courts that are critical of this dual hat approach.
Guidance issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services clearly
states that, for Medicare Advantage organizations,43 “the compliance officer
should be independent [and] not serve in both compliance and operational areas
(e.g., where the compliance officer is also the … general counsel),” because this
leads to “self-policing in the operational area” and a conflict of interest.44 There
is other evidence of disapproval in the text of several corporate integrity
agreements (“CIAs”) that resolve federal fraud and False Claims Act cases. One
such CIA with Pfizer in 2009 explicitly stated that the organization have a “Chief
Compliance Officer [who] shall not be, or be subordinate to, the General Counsel
or Chief Financial Officer.”45
WHAT TO DO?
With respect to the “scope creep” of healthcare compliance officers, the
best solution is to limit their role to that required by federal and state law
governing billing, coding, and physician relationship compliance matters. If
organizations are not required by the FARs or some other legal construct to blur
the distinctions between ethics and compliance, they should not ever do that
voluntarily. Organizations should separate compliance enforcement and
investigation from lapses in aspirational business goals and ideals, for the simple
reason that if you think it is hard for attorneys with lots of specific training on

39. Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 136 F.R.D. 421, 426 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
40. Hartsell v. Hartsell, 393 S.E.2d 570, 578 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d per curiam, 403 S.E.2d
307 (N.C. 1991).
41. Ray v. Cutter Laboratories, 746 F. Supp. 86, 87 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
42. United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1088
(1999).
43. Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Advantage and the PI
Program FAQs (on file with agency).
44. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Managed Car Manual, C.M.S. Pub.
100-16, Ch. 21, §50.2.1 (2013).
45. Corporate Integrity Agreement between Office of the Inspector General and Pfizer, Inc. (Aug.
31, 2009).
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this subject to sort out when something is covered by the privilege or not, it is
going to be even more difficult for a compliance officer not to approach ethics
issues with the same investigative zeal if they are all within his mandate.
Remember that the issue of compliance ultimately is a legal one, so compliance
officers need to have their excitement checked by counsel, even if the federal
government has constructed a framework that all but certainly removes factual
compliance findings from the protection of the attorney-client privilege. That
means that compliance officers should not be permitted to say there is a “breach”
or a “violation” or anything of that sort: they gather facts and present them to the
governing body, which then asks for a legal opinion from counsel.
When lawyers act as compliance officers, or as both general counsel and
compliance officers, this kind of dichotomy will be almost impossible to avoid.
Bright lines being the easiest to see and avoid, the absolute best practice would
be not to let compliance officers who are trained as lawyers act as lawyers, going
so far as asking them to place their licenses in inactive status so that they are
incapable of practicing law. Failing that, not allowing compliance officers to use
their “J.D.” degree description in their official signature would help. If that
particular sacred cow is already out of the barn, whether or not it’s kicked over
the lamp,46 then the burden really falls on the attorney to manage his two-hatted
wardrobe.
So, if the enterprise insists on having a general counsel act as compliance
officer, then there are some steps one can take to help the privilege attach when
it is important for it to do so:
•
•
•
•

In board minutes, clearly identify when the attorney is acting
as an attorney and delineate what discussions are asking for
and receiving legal advice.
Segregate privileged and nonprivileged communications,
perhaps by using different signature lines or different email
accounts.
“Flag” communications which contain legal advice or in
which legal advice is sought.
In all cases, the attorney must be clear on what role he is
playing in the conversation; his actions may inadvertently
cause a misperception about whether the privilege applies to
a particular conversation or not.

Perhaps the best quote on this subject I have found comes from Chancellor
Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court:
46. See RICHARD F. BALES, THE GREAT CHICAGO FIRE AND THE MYTH OF MRS. O’LEARY’S COW
(2002) (referring to the urban legend behind the Great Chicago Fire of 1871).
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The fact that much of the legal advice in this country is now sought
and rendered by thumbs on fruit devices … that’s something that’s
going to lead to, frankly, more things people think [are] privileged that
are not. And the mixing of lawyer roles with business roles is a
danger.47
Let’s be careful out there.

47. Intel Corp. v. NVIDIA Corp., C.A. No. 4373-VCS (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2010).

